



0. Negative sentences of natural language have presupposi-
tions and assertions as well as truth conditions. All that Montague
(PTQ) can tell us about the sentence (1) is its truth condition.
(1) John does not like Mary.
That is to say, the sentence above is true if and only if the
ordered pair of two individuals denoted by 'John' and 'Mary' is not
a member of the set of ordered pairs of individuals denoted by 'like'.
In addition to its truth condition,however, we can infer from this
negative sentence at least one of the following:
(2) a. Someone likes Mary and it is not John, or
b. John likes someone and it is not Mary, or
c. John and Mary have some relation, and it is not liking.
In this paper we will attempt to show that truth conditions,
presuppositions and assertions of negative sentences can be more
systematically explained under the assumption. that (i) the negative
expression 'not' is a basic functional expression, the category of
which is determined by the category of its argument, and (ii) the
argument of 'not' has focus, which plays a key role in determining
the presuppositions and assertions of negative sentences.
Our analysis of 'not' as a basic expression implies not only
that Montague's syntategorematic approach (PTQ) to 'not' and some
other lexical items conceals linguistic cases where homomorphism
does not hold between syntax and semantics, but also that there is
an important theoretical difference between artificial language and
natural language.
1. One of the basic aims of Montague Semantics is to 'charac-
terize the notions of a true sentence'(UG, footnote 2), and Montague
seeks to assign truth values to sentences 'by assigning extralinguis-
tic entities to all expressions involved in the generation of sen-
tences(...) in such a way that (a) the assignment to a compound will
be a function of the entities assigned to its components...'(EFL,
p.217). Partee calls this principle Compositionality and defines it
as given below:
The meaning of an expression is a function of the
meaning of its parts and of the way they are
syntactically combined. (1983, p. 1)
Compositionality is obviously a principle of semantics. However,
'is a function of shows that semantics is closely related to syntax.
The relation between syntax and semantics is shown in Montague as
follows:
(...) the meaning assignment for L determined by )3 is
the unique homomorphism g from <A,F 	 into <B,Gr4arr
such that f S g. (UG, p. 227)
Here
	 is an interpretation for L (that is, an intensional model
for L). <A,Fr>3..-rand <B,Gr>ar- are the syntax and the seman-
tics for L respectively. A is the smallest set including all the
basic expressions and all the expressions generated by all the
structural operations Fr . B is the set of meanings prescribed by
the interpretation )B. Ge. is the semantic operation correspond-
ing to the structural operations Fr . f assigns meanings to the
basic expressions of the language 't. Montague defines the function
homomorphism as follows:
If <A,F4.>4.6 r- and <B,G,OrG a are algebras, then h is
a homomorphism from <A,Ferar- into <13,yreA if and
only if (1) 4A,F4.>r,r and <B,Gr>rep are similar
(in the sense that r- = 4 and, for each rEr- , Fir and
Gr are operations of the same number of places; (2) h
is a function with domain A and range included in B;...,
(UG, p. 225)
Compositionality is obviously a principle of semantics and
whether any semantic theory observes it or not can be examined by
way of homomorphism. Semantics is said to be homomorphic to syn-
tax if the structure of syntax is reflected in that of semantics
in the sense that the structure of the first is identical to the
structure of the second. Here the structure of an expression is
understood to reflect the syntactic relations of the constituents
of the expression. The syntactic relation a word has with the
other expression in a complex expression is shown by way of the
category of the word in PTQ.
If we accept that 'the idea of homomorphism is that of a
structure-preserving transformation of syntax and semantics' as
discussed in Halvorsen and Ladusaw (1979, p. 195) and that the
categories of expressions reflect their syntactic relation, we can
safely infer from these facts that the relation between the cate-
gories of syntax and those of semantics corresponds in a one-to-
one fashion. This conclusion follows from Montague's mapping
function f whose domain is the categories of English and whose
range is the types of intensional logic(PTQ, p. 260). However,
Montague(PTQ) shows us a case of the discrepancy between the cate-
gory of 'not' in syntax and its type in semantics. He introduces
'not' into "1 ' by translation rule T 17.
S 17. If c( 6 PT and S	 , then	 (d, ) ,	 pt , where
(c(	 )=0Ci/ and g is the result of replacing
the first verb in S by its negative third person
singular present;....
T 17. If de Fr and $-:-Fzv , and 4 , si• translate into 40: /, S
respectively, then F il (d ,S ) translates into J X lc A
(the underlines are ours.)
Although we understand the type of 'not' to be <s,t,t, 'in the
usual way t (PTQ, p. 257), its corresponding category of 'not' is
'only implicitly defined, by the totality of the rules of the
grammar' (Partee 1976, footnote 13) and it is anything but t/t.
It is not clear with the exception of some trivial morphological
problems why Montague does not assign 'not' to an expression of
category t/t as in EFL(p. 190). We could dispose of such a cate-
gorial discrepancy simply by assigning the category t/t to 'not'
and conclude that PTQ has no problem with regard to composition-
ality or homomorphism in so far as it is concerned with negation.
Such a solution, however, would prove to be an ad hoc one when
we analyze some English negative sentences which contain 'not',
as below.
Both of the following English sentences bear a similarity
in that they are negative sentences containing 'not'.
(3) a. Every man does not walk.
b. Not every man walks.
PTQ can not only generate (3)a but also explain its ambiguity by
using S 17, S 4, and 5 14. However, it can not generate (3)b in spite
of its similarity to (3)a. We can not avoid this kind of descrip-
tive inadequacy just by analyzing 'not' as an expression of category
tit because it is difficult to find a consistent way of description
when 'not' comes before the sentence and before the verb.
There are many other English negative sentences which can not
be generated by PTQ, even though they contain 'not'.
(4) a. John beats his wife not because he loves her.
b. Not many of the arrows hit the target.
c. Not. very often does Tom go to town.
d. She's a not unprincipled woman.
e. He gave a not completely erroneous answer.
f. Not until you agree to come along will Bill be
willing to face the boss.
g. John tried not to sleep.
These examples reveal that the English word 'not' possesses a
different syntactic behavior from that of the logical expression
' in the sense that ' -1 ' appears only in front of a formula
while 'not' does not have such a fixed position. More importantly,
such a difference is not only related to the way of the arrangement
of expressions but also to their functions in the sentences it
appears, as will be seen below,
2. We are now in a position to analyze, examine, and elaborate
the negative expression 'not' as an English word, not simply as
exact corresponding counterpart of the logical negative expression,
Montague defines the set of categories of English as 'the
smallest set X such that (1) e and t are in X and (2) whenever A
and B are in
	 A/B and A//B are also in X'(PTQ, p. 249).
This categorial definition is based on Ajdukiewicz (1935, English
edition 1967). Ajdukiewicz was concerned with the problem of
syntactic connection and tries to specify 'the conditions under
which a word pattern, constituted of meaningful words, forms an
expression which itself has a unified meaning' (1967, p. 207).
Furthermore, he classifies e and t as basic categories and all
others as function categories. Though he does not give us the
precise definitions of these categories, functor categories are
understood as categories whose expressions take another expression
as their argument from his definition that " a 'function' is the
same as a 'functional sign', or 'an unsaturated symbol' with
brackets following it". In Ajdukiewicz's terms, the categories
defined by the second clause of Montague's categorial definitions
are functor categories, whose forms are either A/B or A//B.
'not' is neither a name nor a sentence, rather it is a functor
expression whose category form is either A/B or A//B. Therefore,
the category of the expression which 'not' takes as its argument
determines both the category of 'not' and that of the whole resulted
expressions. It is not difficult to find out the expressions 'not'
negates in the sentence (1) if we extend it in the following way:
(5) a. John does not like Mary but Jack likes Mary.
b. John does not like Mary but John likes Jane.
c. John does not like Mary but John hates Mary.
(5) shows that 'not' can negates 'John', 'Mary' and 'like': The
resulted expressions (i.e. 'not John', 'not like', 'not Mary')
have the same syntactic functions as those of the original expres-
sions (i.e. 'John', 'like', 'Mary'). Therefore,the category of
'not' in the sentence (1) is either T/T, or IV/IV according to
the category of the expression 'not' negates. Furthermore, the
following examples in (6) show that 'not' negates almost every
word in the sentence and even the tense which is not expressed in
a word form and that the category of 'not' should be determined
explicitly according to which expression 'not' negates in the
sentence.
(6) a. Not every boy walks but some boys walk.
b. Not every boy walks but every girl walks.
c. Reagan is not a French president but he is an
American president.
d. The book is not on the table but it is under the table.
e. John does not like Mary but he used to like her.
The analysis tree of the sentence (1) is (7) according to PTQ.
(7)	 John does not like Mary, 11
John	 like Mary, 5
like	 Mary
On the other hand, we can assign at least three different analysis
trees to the sentence (1) according to the arguments of 'not'..
We need some new functional rules related to 'not'.
(8) S 101 If g e ?yr, e; e PT , then F 101 C
where Flit  ( 5 ,(3 )= 5/3 .
S 102 If S e Prviv	 Fly , then F 1 c 1	 , )6 Fly. •
(9) a.	 John does not like Mary (R )
not	 John	 like	 Mary, 4
not John, 101	 like Mary, 5
not	 John	 like	 Mary
b. John does not like Mary (R )
	.
John	 not	 like	 Mary, 4
John	 not like Mary, 5
	
not like, 101	 Mary
/N
not	 like
c. John does not like Mary (R )
John	 like	 not	 Mary, 4
John	 like not Mary, 5
like	 not Mary, 101
/
not	 Mary
The analysis trees in (9) demonstrate the categories of 'not'
more explicitly than that of (7). The notion 'category' is
significant in any theoretical system because of its function to
make the description much simpler. 'not', as a word of high
frequency in English, should be classified to various categories
according to its argument category for the sake of simpler des-
cription. Furthermore, 'not' is a functor expression whose argu-
ment must be identified so that we can understand the meaning of
the sentence where 'not' occurs. That is the second role of the
category which reveals the relation among elements of a sentence.
Though our analysis of 'not' in (9) agrees with much of our
linguistic intuition (as shown in (5) and (6)), some differences
arise, which Montague's approach (PTO) as shown in (7) does not
address. The expressions 'not John', 'not Mary', 'not like' in (9)
are disambiguated well-formed expressions generated by syntactic
rules, so they are not actual English expressions. They do not
violate Partee's well-formed constraint, that is, "each syntactic
rule operates on well-formed expressions of specified categories
to produce a well-formed expression of a specified category"
(1979, p. 276). Here, Partee uses the term ''well-fromed expres-
sion" in the sense of Montague's meaningful expression in UG(1970)
and PTQ(.1973, pp. 256-7) , and clarifies the notion "the well-
formedness constraint" by pointing out that 'the constraint(...)
is imposed by Montague on the disambiguated language L', and he
imposed no comparable constraint on the final or "surface" language
L, (...)." This implies that there can be some formal differences
between actual English expressions and disambiguated expressions.
Montague (UG, p. 226) attributes these differences to the disambi-
guating relation R with domain of disambiguated expressions and
range of ambiguous actual expressions. Partee(1979, p. 277) speci-
fies R as including deleting labelled brackets, erasing the sub-
scripts of variables, and some morphological operations such as
changing 'PAST see' to 'saw' and 'she (.4.-ACC)' to 'her'. Through
the comparison of the analysis trees (7) and (9) we can say that
(7) lacks one step of deriving the final disambiguated expression.
For example, (7) is the analysis tree of the English sentence 'John
does not like Mary', which is an actual sentence not corresponding
to its disambiguated expression. As a result, the ambiguating
relation R can be misunderstood as a part of a syntactic operation
(such as F 11 in PTQ). The disambiguated expression of 'John does
not like Mary' or 'John like not Mary' and these should be put
under the actual English sentence as in (9), and the ambiguating
relation R relates these two different kinds of expressions.
When we compare the English sentence and its corresponding ambi-
guated expressions, we can understand the function of the ambiguat-
ing relation R more clearly. One of the effects the binary relation
R performs in (9) is to rearrange 'not' of the last stage of the
disambiguated expression as in the actual English sentence. The
complete identification and formalization of the relation R, however,
seems to be another problem yet to be solved and lies beyond the
scope of our present paper.
Montague (PTQ, p. 262) translates 'not' into the logical
expression ' -1 ' without showing its type just as he does not
identify its category directly. Such a translation is possible
only because of its syncategorematical introduction. On the other
hand, as our approach introduces 'not' as a basic expression and
assigns it various categories according to those of its arguments,
we have to show its corresponding types and logical expressions.
We will follow the logical tradition in translating 'not' into the
logical expression ' -1 ', and in interpreting it as showing that
the formula immediately following	 ' is not true, that is, the
extension of the argument of the formula is not a member of the
extension of the predicate of the formula. We will make use of
the lamda-device in representing various types of 'not'. Two
different categories of 'not' are found in C.91 and they are
translated into logical expressions as in (101 according to
Montague's translation rules of categories CPTQ, p. 260).
(. 10) a. If not G B T/T	 , then	 (not) -= ;LCDAP1F -I P).
b. If not E Bj , then S (not) = 71-P it x 1 P
Now we can compare two methods (Montague's and ours) . by translating
the sentence (1) based on (7) and (9).
John does not like Mary	 1 like ' Cj ,m)(7')
John 1p1t pt".51 like Mary 4 71.-x like' (x, ftm )
like 4 ApAxlike t (x,2 ) Mary =4 a. PPIA/m1
(9')	 John does not like Mary (R )
not John like Mary	 like'*(j,m)
znot Jhn, A.10 11 FiA3) like Mary Axlike'(x,"m*)
notJohn	 like	 Mary *it-FPI/4JY,
C-7:1 	 • ,/k.r t	 4/LiqL.xlike (X, `I
b. John does not like Mary (R )
notMary, 4	 *(j ,m)like
John	 p 1-. , 5 1	 not like Mary	 x• "'"/1-)°>1.4 I e IC; .)1",,:)171
not like ,	Mary 4/k PP L A 4$11
21.?/147^;(.7Ax l ike'Cx, 27)) PP fx)
not ,;,;1.5-/1,/-"AxS	 ,{4 1 like	 xlike (x,P)
John does not like Mary (R )c.
John	 like not Mary •=:. 	 like'*(j,m)
John Appia45) like not Mary 7-;>Ax--1 like Cx,
like	 not Mary
=29%
 it x like'	 )
not	 Mary it, Fp f.




used as in PTQ with the exception of S whose type is <<s, <<s,
<<s,e> ,t >> , <<-s ,e > ,t>>> . As (7') and ( .9') reveal, both
approaches give the sane logical expression ' 	 like t ie (j,m) i to
the sentence (1). In other words, both approaches give it the
same truth condition. Therefore, they satisfy the aim of Montague
Semantics: the construction of the truth conditions of declarative
sentences.
3. Montague (.UG, p. 223) begins his semantic theory under
the assumption that "there is no important theoretical difference
between natural language and the artificial language of logicians",
and this is true when we restrict "the basic aim of semantics to
characterizing the notions of a true sentence (...) and of entail-
ment" (UG, footnote 2). However, sentences of natural languages,
unlike those of artificial languages, convey presuppositions and
assertions in addition to truth values and entailments. Presuppo-
sitions and assertions play very important roles in natural lan-
guages to the extent that we can not say safely that we understand
the meaning of a given sentence completely without the presupposi-
tions and assertions conveyed by the sentence.
When we are talking about presuppositions and assertions of
a sentence, our discussion goes beyond the boundary of truth-
conditional semantics. Presuppositions and assertions lie in the
domain of pragmatics in the sense that we can not say anything
about them without referring to the context in which e'sentence is
uttered. Within the context are included speakers, hearers and
some other elements. Stalnaker (1978, p. 321) defines presupposi-
tions as "what is taken by the speaker to the COMMON GROUND of the
participants in the conversation, what is treated as their COMMON
KNOWLEDGE or MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE". Sentence (1) can have at least
three different presuppositions according to which expression 'not'
negates in it. In spoken English, the negated expression receives
a stress and the stressed expression becomes the focus in the
sentence. We can determine the presuppositions of sentence (1) by
replacing the focus by a variable in the following way (cf. Chomsky
(1971), A. von Stechew (1981)) •
(11) a. 5x C.,X likes Mary)
b. Ex Tpo hn Xed Mary]
c. zi",‹ (John likes X
The three propositions in (11) represent some of the possible
presuppositions of the sentence (1). When the sentence (1) is
uttered, we can grasp which one of the above presuppositions is
conveyed by way of the stress. Because of their relation to stress,
Chomsky(1971, pp. 199-207) assigns presuppositions to a sentence
at the level of its surface structure. Sentences have assertions
in addition to presuppositions. The subjects of the assertions
refer to the variables of the presuppositions and these variables
have the foci of the sentence. Therefore, we can detect these
assertions only by way of the stress just as in the case of
presuppositions. For illustration, the sentence (1) has at
least three different pairs composed of presuppositions and asser-
tions like (12).
(12) a. Someone likes Mary and it is not John.
b. John likes someone and it is not Mary.
c. John and Mary have some relation and it is not liking.
In (12), the first three clauses are equal to the three propositions
in (10) except the replacement of 'someone' and 'some relation' for
the variables. The second three clauses constitute the assertions
conveyed by the sentence (1). As said at the outset, we can infer
(12) from the sentence (. 1) only under the assumption that the sen-
tence (1) is true.
Even though the sentence (1) has only the one truth-condition,
as revealed in (7') and (V), it can convey three different pairs
of presuppositions and assertions according to the different focus
assignment (cf. A. Stechew, 1981). As the argument of 'not' receives
stress and becomes the focus of the negative sentence, our approach
to 'not' as a basic expression can provide a ground for dealing
with presuppositions and assertions as well as truth-conditions of
negative sentences in the framework of Montague Grammar just by
assigning various categories to 'not' according to its argument.
In English and some other languages the negative expression has a
fixed position before a verb and its argument is indicated by the
stress, while in Russian, the negative expression 'ne' comes before
its argument. Dahl(1979, p. 23) "makes a distinction between
focus-dependent placement and verb-dependent Neg placement" accord-
ing to the interaction between focus and the negative expression.
He shows three different Russian sentences corresponding to English
sentence (13).
(13)	 I do not read newspapers on Sundays.
(14) a. ► e ja Eitaju gazety po voskresen' jam.
b. Ja ne Eitaju gazety po voskresen' jam.
c. Ja Eitaju gazety ne po voskresen' jam.
The English negative sentence is less ambiguous as for focus
when it is uttered than when it is written. The corresponding
negative sentences (14) do not possess such an ambiguity problem.
This Russian example strongly supports our analysis of 'not' as a
basic expression as shown in (9).
Up to now, we have analyzed English negative sentences under
the assumption that the different focus assignment does not affect
the truth conditions of a sentence and it changes only its presuppo-
sitions and assertions (cf. A. Stechew (1981), p. 95). Moravcsik
(1983, p. 235), on the other hand, insists that "'Mary did not walk
into the house' has different truth conditions depending on whether
we stress "Mary' or 'the house ? ". Partee (personal communication,
1983) also makes a similar assertion that the sentence 'If John
hadn't married Susan, he wouldn't have inherited his grandfather's
fortune.' has different truth conditions depending on whether we
stress 'Susan' or 'married'.
Another problem to be solved is whether the notion of truth
condition in Moravcsik and Partee is the same as that of Montague.
Yet it seems to be obvious that in natural language stress performs
a significant role with regard to the meaning of sentences including
truth conditions, presuppositions and assertions. We can suggest the
possibility that Montague Grammar can easily deal with even presuppo-
sitions and assertions by assigning 'not' to various categories
according to its arguments.
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